What the LWMP actually says (not opinions)
1. The system was already deficient in 2016
Storm system had multiple undersized pipes for a 10-year storm event, causing surcharging 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
No stormwater treatment at outfalls to the Miami River or Harrison Lake — untreated urban runoff was being discharged directly into receiving waters 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Several pipes were in poor or collapsing condition requiring replacement 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Bottom line: the system was not in “good shape” even before growth.
2. Sanitary sewer risks were understated due to missing data
Consultants repeatedly note missing or inadequate flow data as a major limitation of the analysis 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Cross-connections between storm and sanitary systems were identified as “prevalent” 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Estimated 150–290 L/s of unnecessary flow entering the sanitary system due to cross-connections — a huge red flag 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Translation: the Village did not actually know how bad the sanitary system was.
3. Miami River is a critical vulnerability
Sanitary system includes a siphon crossing the Miami River, already identified for replacement in 2016 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Exposure of infrastructure in the riverbed was flagged as an immediate concern 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Important: this directly links liquid waste risk to the same river now central to flood concerns.
4. Growth assumptions were aggressive — and risky
Plan modeled full build-out under zoning, using a “very conservative” (i.e., high) population of ~4,447 people — nearly 3× actual population at the time 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Consultants explicitly warn that Harrison’s seasonal tourism surges distort demand, stressing systems unevenly 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Key issue: approving density without first fixing infrastructure was already flagged as a risk in 2016.
5. Capital costs were known — and deferred
Millions in storm and sanitary upgrades identified, including:
$1.2M for stormwater treatment at outfalls (High priority) 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Pipe replacements, upsizing, and system retrofits across the village 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
Flow meters and data collection were labeled HIGH priority, yet clearly not implemented at the time 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
This is critical: Council had a costed roadmap and chose not to act decisively.
6. The consultants legally protected themselves
CTQ explicitly states the report relies on Village-supplied data and is not responsible for inaccuracies 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
The report warns it must be updated periodically — not left on a shelf for a decade 2016-12-08 - Liquid Waste Manag…
That protection clause matters today.
Hard conclusions (based on the document)
The Village knew by 2016 that:
Stormwater infrastructure was undersized
Sanitary flows were compromised by cross-connections
The Miami River posed systemic risk
Treatment at outfalls was missing
The Village approved growth anyway
The Village did not fix the data gaps
The Village did not implement high-priority monitoring
This is not hindsight. It is documented foresight.
Why this matters now
If residents are being told today to limit water use, prepare for flooding, or accept emergency measures, that is the direct outcome of decisions made after this report was delivered — not an unforeseeable event.
If you want, next we can:
Cross-reference this LWMP against the 2025 engineering reports
Pull direct quote comparisons showing contradictions
Convert this into a legally safe public summary or FOI-ready brief